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Abstract
We examine whether financial analysts’ forecast accuracy differs between the pre- and
post- adoption of Australian Equivalents to the International Financial Reporting
Standards (AIFRS). We find that forecast accuracy has improved after Australia adopted
AIFRS. As a secondary objective, this paper also investigates the role of financial
analysts in reducing information asymmetry in today’s Australian capital market. We find
weak evidence that more analysts following a stock do not help to improve forecast
accuracy by bringing more firm-specific information to the market.
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1.

Introduction

Financial analysts are viewed as important information intermediaries within capital markets
(Beaver 1998). Regulators and other market participants view analysts’ activities as
increasing the information efficiency of security prices because of their expertise and
knowledge in firm valuation (Frankel, Kothari & Weber 2006). In particular, it is important
to highlight that financial reports are rarely seen as providing a full picture to value a
company, not only from the fact that financial reports do not capture all of the growth
potential of a firm, but also that accounting standards can sometimes limit the usefulness of
some information. One example that is often highlighted is that most investment in
intangibles is considered an expense rather than an asset in the balance sheet. This accounting
treatment of expensing most investment in intangibles tends to undervalue the assets reported
on the balance sheet. These limitations in financial reports reduce the ability of investors to
assess the earnings potential of intangible-rich firms. Therefore there is a tendency for
financial analysts to track and follow more intangible-rich firms, as it is these firms that tend
to be harder to value.
In this paper we investigate directly whether forecast accuracy has changed after
Australia's adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This is
important because there has been some debate about the implication of the adoption of IFRS
in Australia (see, for example, Jones, Rahman & Wolnizer 2004). Some research has argued
that the adoption of IFRS takes Australia to a more restrictive regime and reduces the quality
of financial reporting (see Matolcsy & Wyatt 2006; Ritter & Wells 2006).
On the other hand, the Commonwealth Government 1 and the Financial Reporting
Council 2 (FRC) expect significant benefits from the adoption of IFRS; such as improved
access to international capital markets, more transparent and understandable standards,
improved communication with investors, and higher quality financial reports (see FRC 2002;
CLERP 9 2002; Jones & Higgins 2006). We contribute to this debate by examining whether
analysts' forecast accuracy has changed from the pre-AIFRS period (2002-2004) to the postAIFRS period (2005-2007). The results of our research (after controlling for relevant factors)
show increased forecast accuracy in the post-AIFRS period. The increase in forecast accuracy
of financial analysts – who are considered as important information intermediaries in the
financial market – provides some evidence of the possible positive effect of AIFRS on the
users of financial reports in Australia.
As a secondary objective, we investigate directly whether financial analysts can reduce
information asymmetry in the Australian capital market by improving forecast accuracy. We
do this by investigating whether more analysts following a firm improve forecast accuracy by
producing more firm-specific information to the market The next section of this paper
provides a brief literature review examining the potential impact of AIFRS, and develops the
paper’s hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data used and Section 4 covers the research

1

Australia’s move to IFRS was initiated by the Commonwealth Government as part of its Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program (CLERP). CLERP No. 9 ‘Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial
Reporting Framework’ (released in September 2002) recommended that IFRS be adopted by the Australian
Accounting Standard Board (AASB) by January 2005. CLERP 9 was the ninth in a series of corporate
legislative reforms introduced by the federal government (Brown & Tarca 2005).
2

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has the prime responsibility for accounting regulation in Australia.
FRC members are appointed by the treasurer. Although the FRC is responsible for overall policy direction in
accounting regulation, the development of accounting standards is the responsibility of the Australian
Accounting Standards Board (Haswell & McKinnon 2003).
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design employed for the empirical analysis, which are described in Section 5. The final
section presents the summary and concluding remarks.
2.

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

This paper evaluates the impact of financial reports of Australian companies abiding by
AIFRS since 2005. This takes Australia from its own accounting standard-setting regime to a
new regime. The adoption of AIFRS has proven highly controversial in Australia, and it has
led to the emergence of a lively debate on the benefits and costs of AIFRS. The major
concerns relate to the widespread perception that AIFRS are of a lower quality than the local
Australian accounting standards (Walker & Jones 2003). Many of the claimed benefits of
adopting AIFRS proposed by the Government in its CLERP initiatives (such as the provision
of higher quality accounting standards), are questioned in various research papers (see
Haswell & McKinnon 2003; Lonergan 2003).
The adoption of AIFRS has changed the recognition and measurement practices for
investment in some intangible assets. Under the previous Australian GAAP (AGAAP),
internally generated goodwill was not recognised and purchased goodwill was capitalised.
Moreover, the purchased goodwill was amortised over a maximum period of 20 years. Under
the AIFRS, goodwill is subject to an impairment test. Under the AGAAP both internally
generated and purchased identifiable intangible assets could be recognised. AIFRS classifies
the expenditure on internally generated intangibles into research phases and development
phases (AASB 138). Expenditure on research must be expensed in the current period.
Expenditure incurred in the development phase may be capitalised if it satisfies conditions
related to the completion, technical feasibility and saleability of the asset (AASB 138). Some
internally generated identifiable intangibles that could previously be recognised as assets
under the AGAAP (e.g. mastheads, publishing rights, brands and customer lists) are not
allowable as assets under AIFRS. Intangible assets must be tested for impairment and written
down if their value is impaired under the AIFRS. Capitalised identifiable intangibles can now
be revalued only if the fair value is determined by reference to an active market.
Ritter and Wells (2006) raise the concern that the restrictive rules of AIFRS will
remove some identifiable internally generated intangible assets from the balance sheet. This
means that management is prevented from recognising internally generated intangible assets
such as brand, mastheads and customer loyalty. Investment by companies in such intangibles
is likely to be an important factor in driving future performance (Webster 1999). Prior
evidence suggests that discretionary disclosure of internally generated capitalised intangible
assets is useful to investors (Lev 2001; Wyatt 2005). Thus, in the post-AIFRS period, the
financial reports are likely to provide less information about investment in intangibles, and
this may potentially reduce analysts’ ability to make accurate earnings forecasts.
Australia had its own accounting standard-setting arrangements before adopting the
AIFRS. Australian accounting standards were largely high-quality accounting standards and
even considered to be similar to IFRS (Ashbaugh & Pincus 2001). In 1996, Australia also
took the initiative to harmonise its own accounting standards with the IFRS. So the adoption
of the AIFRS in 2005 may not have brought a substantial change in accounting practices in
Australia. This calls into question the concern raised by some of the potentially reduced
usefulness of financial statements in the post-AIFRS period. However, whether the AIFRS
adoption improves or damages financial reporting in Australia is open to empirical
investigation. This paper provides evidence on the debate by focusing on analysts’ forecast
errors in the pre-AIFRS (2002-2004) and post-AIFRS (2005-2007) periods. Our null
hypothesis is:
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H1: Earnings forecast accuracy has not changed in the post-AIFRS period from the
pre-AIFRS period.
This study will therefore contribute to the growing literature that provides empirical
evidence on the impact of the AIFRS in Australia. Using AIFRS and AGAAP measures of
goodwill and identifiable intangible assets available in the financial reports of 2005 3 ,
Chalmers, Clinch and Godfrey (2008) find evidence that AIFRS conveys incremental useful
information (beyond that available in AGAAP) in relation to goodwill only. For total
intangible assets, they do not find any evidence that the AIFRS provides information beyond
that in AGAAP. In fact, they find evidence that AGAAP provides incremental information in
relation to identifiable intangibles. Gallery, Cooper and Sweeting (2008) provide evidence
that the quality of disclosures about the likely effects of AIFRS can be explained by audit
quality, company-specific and industry-specific factors4 . On the basis of information
available in the 2004/05 and 2005/06 annual reports, Cheung, Evans and Wright (2008)
compare the projected and realised impact of the introduction of AASB 138 in terms of
reported intangible assets and key financial measures. They find that the reported AIFRS
results are different to the forecast results for intangible assets and only the debt to equity
ratio is significantly different under the AGAAP and AIFRS.
The second issue that this paper addresses is the role of financial analysts in reducing
information asymmetry. Financial reports provide information about the earnings potential of
a firm by disclosing its earnings, assets and liabilities. However, information available in
financial reports is constrained by accounting standards. Accounting standards require the
satisfaction of recognition rules to disclose items on financial statements. Accounting mostly
recognises expenditure on intangibles (such as research and development, and advertising) as
expenses. Most of the investments in internally generated intangibles (such as brand,
customer loyalty and goodwill) are not shown on the balance sheet as assets even though
firms invest in such intangibles to increase their future income. In order to recognise
expenditure as an asset, it needs to be probable that future economic benefits will flow into
the business. This probability test requires a high degree of certainty regarding the future
economic benefits that will flow from the expenditure.
Unfortunately, it is sometimes hard to determine the amount and timing of economic
benefits that will eventuate from investments in intangibles with any degree of certainty.
Investments in intangibles (such as advertising expenditure), are often expensed in the current
year, as it is hard to know when the pecuniary benefits will flow. There would effectively be
a difficulty in matching the expenditure on intangibles to the resulting future income. As a
result, this leads to most investments in intangibles being recognised as an expense in the
year they occur. On the other hand, investments in tangible items (such as buildings and
machinery) do not face the same difficulties since the amount and timing of economic
benefits from such investments are far more easily measurable with greater certainty.

3

AASB 1 First-time adoption of Australian Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards
requires an entity to explain how the transition from AGAAP to AIFRS affects its financial statements.

4

AASB 147 Disclosing Impacts of Adopting AIFRS required a two-step approach to the disclosure of the
expected effects of AIFRS adoption. Reporting entities were required to provide a narrative explanation of the
expected differences in accounting policies in their 2004 financial reports. In annual or interim financial reports
ending on or after 30 June 2005, reporting entities were required to provide reliable information about the
impacts on the financial report had it been prepared using the AIFRS (Gallery, Cooper & Sweeting 2008).
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The accounting treatment of expensing most of the investments in intangibles makes
the accounting earnings (profit) less representative of the real earnings of a firm. In particular,
the profit of a firm will be understated in years in which large investments are made in
intangibles. The profit of the firm will be overstated in subsequent years as economic benefits
(i.e. income) will result from prior years’ investment in intangibles but no expense will be
charged against such income. Thus the accounting treatment of investments in intangibles
makes the reported earnings volatile. This is referred to as the ‘noise effect’. As a result,
analysts may find it hard to predict earnings based on the recorded past earnings of firms who
have a higher investment in intangibles. Previous empirical studies have already
demonstrated a positive relationship between financial analysts’ earnings forecast errors and
the disclosure of ‘noisier’ information (Lobo, Kwon & Ndubizu 1998). Imhoff and Lobo
(1992) conjecture that forecast dispersion in preannouncement analysts’ earnings forecasts is
a proxy for noise in the firm’s earnings number.
The difficulty of predicting the earnings of intangible-rich companies is likely to
increase the demand for analysts’ earnings forecasts since analysts are seen to have a superior
ability to assess the earnings potential of firms (Kwon 2002). Barth, Kasznik and McNichols
(2001) show that more analysts follow intangible-rich companies in the United States (US) as
there is an increased demand for earnings forecasts for these companies. Also, due to their
potential high growth opportunity, intangible-rich firms are likely to attract more attention
from investors, financial analysts, and the general investment community compared to other
firms (Kwon 2002). If companies with a higher investment in intangibles undergo closer
scrutiny by a larger number of financial analysts as objects of recommendation, this will
increase the potential for more accurate information available for such companies (Kwon
2002). The availability of more accurate information, may in turn lead to a higher level of
financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for intangible-rich firms. This is commonly
referred to as the ‘information effect’, as documented by Greenstein and Sami (1994) when
referring to more analysts following firms in the US.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that a higher investment in intangibles brings
two competing effects; namely, the noise effect and the information effect. Although there is
more demand for analysts to follow firms with high intangibles that could imply more
accurate earnings forecasts, the reported earnings of such firms are also likely to be more
unpredictable. In other words, this could lead the noise effect to dominate over the
information effect as high intangible firms have more unrecognised assets and this makes it
harder for analysts to accurately forecast earnings.
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Lys and Sohn (1990) and Francis and Soffer (1997)
show that – on average – analysts’ reports communicate important information to markets for
valuation and trading purposes. Kim and Schroeder (1990) attribute security analysts’
forecasting accuracy to their ability to incorporate relevant information other than that
included in the historical earnings of a firm. When a firm goes through close scrutiny by
more analysts, there is more information available about the firm. In particular, Kwon (2002)
states that with the improvement in information technology and internet facilities, new
information quickly flows through to the investment community. This availability of more
information as a result of an increased analysts’ following reduces earnings forecast error.
Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) provided evidence in Australia between 1992 and
1996 that analyst forecast error is negatively related to the number of analysts following a
firm. Therefore, we test to see if this relationship still holds, and following from Brown,
Taylor and Walter (1999) we hypothesise that the forecast error is negatively related to the
number of analysts following a firm:
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H2: Earnings forecast error is negatively related to the number of analysts following a
firm.
3.

Sample and Data

The study focuses on the top 100 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in
terms of market capitalisation between 2002 and 2007. All analysts’ forecast earnings per
share for each company from the start of 2002 until the end of 2007 are extracted from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. To avoid any potential survivorship
bias, companies which have been part of the ASX100 constituent list between 2002 and 2007
are incorporated in our research. There are 142 companies incorporated into the ASX100
constituent list between 2002 and 2007. At any given point in time, the ASX100 constituent
list contains only 100 companies 5 . 77 companies are excluded from the study due to
insufficient analyst forecast data before and/or after the introduction of AIFRS in Australia.
This leaves us with 65 companies over a 6-year time period. We ignored year 2008 in our
studies to avoid any potential confounding effects from the Global Financial Crisis which
started at the beginning of July 2007. Also, given that some companies are not listed at the
beginning of the sample period and some companies delisted during the study period, we had
an unbalanced dataset. Our research covers 35 institutional brokers and 657 analysts who
provide earnings estimates over the sample periods. In particular, we focussed on the “Detail
History” document (Analyst Earnings Estimate History) provided by the I/B/E/S database. To
maintain consistency, the actual earnings per share data for each company were also extracted
from the I/B/E/S database. The initial sample contained 20,823 individual analyst forecast
observations (EPS). Information about accounting variables such as total assets, total debt,
intangible assets, research and development expenses, and total expenses were obtained from
Thomson Financial databases. In addition, the Total Return Index (used to determine the
stock price volatility) was downloaded from the Datastream Database6 .
The one-year forward earnings forecasts – made within 30 days after the release of
annual financial statements – are used in this study. This means, for example, that if a
company releases its annual financial statement for the fiscal year ending June 30th 2002 on
the 1st August 2002, that we collected individual analyst forecast data available between 1st
August and 30th August 2002. This ensures that analysts impound in their forecast the
information from the financial report of the year prior to the forecast year. In the event that
the same analyst provided more than one forecast during the 30 days period, only the first
forecast was incorporated in our study. This ensured that our results were not driven by those
analysts who consistently update their forecast earnings. The reason of having a cut-off point
of 30 days after the release of annual financial statement is that we wanted to make sure
analysts get the time to read and reflect on the information of the financial reports in their
forecasts. The larger the time gap between the reporting date and the analyst forecasting date,
the greater the effects of other information sources (in addition to information available in the
annual financial reports) integrated with the forecast data. For example, analysts making
forecasts in December 2002 may consider other information surrounding the first 6 months of
the fiscal year (July to December 2002).
4.

Research Design

We used a panel regression model across the 65 companies over the 2002-2007 time period.
Specifically, a cross-section firm fixed effects estimation is used in the panel data analysis in
5
6

Technically speaking, the constituent list can be updated on a monthly basis.
The stock price volatility is calculated based on the weekly changes in Total Return Index.
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order to take into account the impact of unobserved factors on the dependent variable across
different companies. In particular, the forecast error for a company may not only be
connected to financial variables like total assets or intangible assets, but may also correlate
with industry effects and individual company characteristics, such as management expertise
and historical reputation, which are not captured by any financial variables. Thus, including a
different intercept for every cross-section in the panel data analysis eliminated possible
omitted variable bias from the panel regression results. To minimise potential autocorrelation
problems, we used White’s correction to cross-section standard errors to allow for general
contemporaneous correlations between the company residuals in the panel model. Also, we
utilised the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) method to correct for the cross-section
heteroscedasticity issue.
Following Ali, Klein and Rosenfield (1992) the unsigned forecast error, FEit, for
company i at time t is constructed as follows:
FEit = | ( Mean forecast EPSit – Actual EPSit ) / Actual EPSit |

(1)

To test H1 and H2, we estimate the following panel regression model:
FEit = α0 + ui + β1 IFRSit + β2 NOAit + β3 TAit + β4 TDTAit + β5 MVBVit +
β6 INTTAit + β7 RDTEXPit + β8 STDEVit + β9 ROEit + eit
t=2002, 2003, … , 2007;

(2)

i=company 1, 2, ... , 65

Where:
ui

= fixed effect for company i

IFRSit

= 1 if company i adopted the IFRS at time t and 0 otherwise

NOAit

= number of analysts who generate forecasts of earnings (analysts’
following) for company i at time t

TAit

= natural logarithm of total assets for company i at time t

TDTAit

= total debt divided by total assets (leverage ratio) for company i at
time t

MVBVit

= market value of equity divided by book value of equity for
company i at time t

INTTAit

= intangible assets recorded on the balance sheet divided by total
assets for company i at time t

RDTEXPit = research & development expenditure divided by total expenses
for company i at time t
STDEVit

= standard deviation of weekly stock returns for company i at
time t
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ROEit

= return on equity for company i at time t

eit

= residual for company i at time t

The coefficient β1 for the variable IFRS measures the relationship of forecast errors
between pre-AIFRS and post-AIFRS periods as stated in Hypothesis 1. A statistically
significant positive (negative) sign for β1 indicates that the forecast error has increased
(decreased) in the post-AIFRS period. The coefficient β2 for the variable NOA measures the
relationship between forecast error and number of analysts following a firm as stated in
Hypothesis 2. A statistically significant positive sign for β2 indicates that the forecast error is
higher for firms which are followed by more analysts (the domination of the noise effect over
the information effect). A statistically significant negative sign for β2 indicates the domination
of the information effect over the noise effect.
Consistent with previous literature, 7 control variables are also incorporated in the
panel data analysis. The 7 control variables are: size, leverage, growth opportunity,
capitalised intangible assets, research and development expenditure (R&D), business risk and
profitability. We explain the importance of each of these control variables below.
Size
Lang and Lundholm (1996) argue that trading in securities is less costly for large firms with a
large market value of equity. This increases the incentive for analysts to follow these firms.
Barron et al. (2002) show a positive association between firm size and the quantity of
information available to analysts. Thus, we control for firm size in our analyses using the
natural logarithm of total assets (TA). We expect a negative relationship between firm size
and analysts’ forecast error.
Leverage
Total debt divided by total assets (TDTA) reflects the financial risk of a firm. As a firm’s
debt increases, the task of accurately evaluating its debt-paying ability becomes more
complex. To forecast company earnings, financial analysts would have to consider the
inflation rate, interest rate, current and future operating cash flows and other relevant
variables (Kwon 2002). These complexities would lead to a greater deviation among
analysts’ earnings forecasts. We expect a positive relationship between leverage as measured
by total debt divided by total asset (TDTA) and forecast error.
Growth Opportunity
Analysts invest resources to know more about high-growth firms, as there is a higher demand
for private information about such firms (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990). The
market value of equity divided by book value of equity (MVBV) is used as a proxy for
growth opportunities. High growth firms may provide additional information using various
methods (such as press releases, company websites and an annual general meeting) to inform
potential investors about their growth potential. This higher level of information may help
analysts to make better earnings forecasts. A negative coefficient for the growth proxy will
provide evidence of the information effect brought by a greater level of voluntary disclosure
by these firms.
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Intangible Assets and Research and Development Expenditure
The accounting standard requires the satisfaction of certain conditions in order to capitalise
investments in intangibles. These recognition conditions often take most of the investment in
intangibles out of the balance sheet. However, some investments in intangibles (such as
purchased goodwill, patents, copyrights and trademarks) are recorded on the balance sheet.
These investments in intangibles are important for analysts as they reflect the future earnings
potential of firms. Consistent with previous research, intangible assets divided by total assets
(INTTA) 7 and research & development expenditure divided by total expenses (RDTEXP)
were incorporated into the panel data analysis (see Barron et al. 2002).
Business Risk and Profitability
Consistent with previous research (see Brown, Taylor & Walter 1999) we control for
business risk. One would expect that the higher the business risk of a company, the more
difficult it is to forecast the company’s earnings. We take the standard deviation of weekly
stock returns (STDEV) as a measure of uncertainty in the market about a particular stock.
The forecast error is expected to be higher for stocks with higher uncertainty. Also, the
standard deviation of the stock returns also indirectly reflects the market condition (macroeconomic factor) and company specific information (micro-economic factor) for a given
financial year. This will ensure that the panel regression results are not driven or influenced
by a time factor or market economic conditions.
Previous studies have indicated that the profitability of a business will influence the
level of disclosure of a company (Wallace & Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-Ansah
1998; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh 2005; Gallery, Cooper & Sweeting 2008). The higher the
profitability of a business, the more information will be disclosed to the public to minimise
the undervaluation of the company’s shares. One could expect that the level of disclosure
would influence analysts’ forecast errors. Typically, the return on shareholders’ equity (ROE)
is used as a proxy for company profitability.
5.

Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable forecast error (FE) and all independent
variables are provided in Table 1 (see Appendices for all tables). The mean of FE is greater
than the median indicating that the distribution of forecast errors is positively skewed. With
the exception of intangible assets (INTTA) and research & development expenditure
(RDTEXP), the mean and median of all other independent variables are not greatly different 8 .
The high (mean and median) return on equity (ROE) is partly driven by the outstanding
companies’ performances in the financial year ended 2006. We also analysed the correlation
matrix (Table 2) of all independent variables to ensure that there was no serious
multicollinearity problem in the sample. From this, the highest correlation obtained was
between market to book value of equity (MVBV) and research and development expenditure
7

Our study utilises Thomson ONE Banker as the primary data source. Here, the database classifies goodwill as
part of intangible assets.

8

The mean and median of unscaled total assets are significantly different. However the mean and median of
natural logarithm of total assets (TA) are not significantly different. The natural logarithm of total assets is used
in the panel regression model.

73

AAFBJ | Volume 4, no. 3, 2010

(RDTEXP) at 40%. The correlation is statistically significant at a level of 5%. Given that
many growth firms tend to invest more heavily in research & development, it is not surprising
to find a positive relationship between these two variables (MVBV & RDTEXP). Also, the
size of the company (TA) seems to be moderately correlated with several other control
variables. For example, large companies (high TA) tend to have lower growth opportunities
(low MVBV) and invest less in R&D (low RDTEXP & INTTA). In addition, large
companies usually have a lower business risk (low STDEV). Therefore we conclude that the
size of the company (TA) has a negative relationship with the four other control variables
(MVBV, RDTEXP, INTTA & STDEV).
Panel Data Analysis
The results of the panel data analysis are presented in Table 3 (see Appendices for all tables).
To provide a robustness check for the results in our model, different permutations of the
regression model are presented in Table 4 that utilise different combinations of the control
variables. Technically, if the results for β1 and β2 are significant, then they should remain
consistent even when we change the set of control variables in the model. To minimise the
potential multicollinearity problem, we drop the total assets (TA) as a control variable in
most of the equations.
Also, given that some small companies may have a lower number of analysts following
them, the mean of forecast EPS may not be the most appropriate measure of central tendency.
The impact of one extreme forecast EPS can have a significant impact on the mean
calculation for the dataset with a low number of observations. The median of forecast EPS
may be more useful than the mean when there are extreme values in the dataset. To minimise
potential problems related to mean calculation and to improve the robustness of the analysis,
the median of forecast EPS is also used to calculate the forecast error. The panel data analysis
results using the median forecast EPS are presented in Table 4. This secondary set of results
will again provide a robustness check for any conclusions we make in regard to β1 and β2.
As shown in both Table 3 and Table 4, the F-statistics are statistically significant across
all 16 equations. In addition, the coefficient for AIFRS dummy β1 is negative and statistically
significant for all equations. Indeed, the β1 is statistically significant at 99% confidence level
(p-value < 0.01) for 13 of the 16 regressions across Tables 3 and 4. The negative coefficient
β1 implies that analysts’ forecast error has decreased in the post-AIFRS period as compared
to the pre-AIFRS period. The result provides some evidence that the adoption of AIFRS has
improved the quality of the financial reports to the extent that analysts are able to make a
better prediction about the future profitability of the companies. This result is consistent with
the findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Focusing mainly on Swiss, French and
Canadian companies, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that the accuracy of analysts’
forecasts increases after firms voluntarily adopted the IFRS. Putting the potential sample bias
inherent in voluntary adoption aside, this study supports the view that the adoption of IFRS
reduces the burden upon financial analysts to understand different accounting standards and
lessens their need to make adjustments in order to improve forecast accuracy. This can be
argued to have reduced the cost of processing financial information by analysts and is likely
to induce greater stock market efficiency.
On the other hand, analysts’ following is positively correlated with forecast error. The
positive coefficient β2 is statistically significant across all 16 regressions. The positive
relationship indicates that analysts’ forecast error increases as more analysts start to follow a
firm. The result contrasts Brown, Taylor and Walter’s (1999) study. It indicates that
information effect generated by a higher number of analysts does not offset the noise effect
due to unrecognised intangibles. However, given that the coefficient of β2 is relatively small
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(less than 0.01), one may argue that the economic significance of the analysts’ following is
negligible.
As for the control variables, two control variables are statistically significant across
Table 3 and Table 4. The growth effect (MVBV) has the predicted negative relation with
forecast error. Consistent with the literature (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990),
there is an incentive for growth firms to provide more private information to the market. This
will in turn reduce the information asymmetry between investors and the firm. The higher
level of information provided by the growth firms will help analysts to make better earnings
forecasts. Also, consistent with our expectation, the higher the business risk of a company,
the more difficult it is to forecast the companysearnings. There is a strong positive
relationship between the uncertainty of the business (STDEV) and the forecast error.
6.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed two issues that can have an important bearing on the accuracy of
earnings forecasts in the Australian capital market. The first is whether the adoption of
AIFRS may have led to any change in the accuracy of earnings forecasts. The results from
our analysis support the Financial Reporting Council’s expectation that the introduction of
AIFRS would increase the reporting quality in Australia, inasmuch as it has improved
analysts’ forecasts. The reduction in forecast error in the post-AIFRS period compared to the
same in the pre-AIFRS period has important implications for financial reporting practices in
Australia as it provides evidence of the increased usefulness of financial statements after the
adoption of AIFRS. The statistically significant coefficient for the IFRS dummy variable for
pre- and post-AIFRS periods reflects the increased forecast accuracy in the post-AIFRS
period after controlling for the other relevant factors. Financial analysts act as important
information intermediaries in the financial market. They are one of the important and
informed users of financial reports. The relative improvement in the accuracy of analysts’
forecasts does show a positive side to the adoption of the new accounting standards.
The second item that this paper focussed on was whether there is a significant
relationship between the number of analysts that follow a firm and the forecast error. We did
not find support for Brown, Taylor and Walter’s (1999) earlier work of a negative
relationship between forecast error and number of analysts following a firm. Rather, this
paper provides evidence that the more analysts following a stock do not help to improve
forecast accuracy by bringing more firm specific information to the market.
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Appendices
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.

FE

NOA

TA

TDTA

MVBV

INTTA

RDTEXP

STDEV

ROE

0.1872
0.1034
2.3347
0.0003
0.2896

4.4777
4.0000
13.0000
1.0000
2.1491

8.6146
8.3494
13.2417
4.9994
1.7193

24.8043
25.9241
79.0069
0.0000
12.8889

3.8023
2.6430
47.5050
0.4961
4.2691

0.1699
0.0762
0.7777
0.0000
0.2192

0.0073
0.0000
0.2155
0.0000
0.0273

0.2373
0.2179
1.0408
0.1074
0.0931

22.0577
20.9781
483.1395
-63.7398
38.7135

This study uses the one-year forward earnings forecast (FE) that is made within 30 days after the release of annual financial statement. FE is the
unsigned forecast error of company earnings. FE=|(Mean forecast EPS – Actual EPS)/Actual EPS|.
NOA is the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). TDTA is
equal to total debt divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets
recorded on the balance sheet divided by total assets. RDTEXP is research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity. ROE represents net income (all operating and non-operating
income and expense, income taxes and extraordinary items) after preference dividend divided by total common equity. Common equity
represents common shareholders’ investment in a company. Total number of observations is 381.
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix

TA
TDTA
MVBV
INTTA
RDTEXP
STDEV
ROE

TA
1.00
‐0.01
‐0.26***
‐0.29***
‐0.28***
‐0.31***
‐0.05

TDTA

MVBV

INTTA

RDTEXP

STDEV

ROE

1.00
0.10*
0.30***
0.02
‐0.02
‐0.05

1.00
‐0.03
0.40**
0.08
0.17***

1.00
0.02
‐0.08
‐0.04

1.00
0.21***
0.03

1.00
‐0.07

1.00

***indicates the correlation is significant at the 1% level, **indicates the correlation is significant at the 5% level
and *indicates the correlation is significant at the 10% level.
NOA is the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total
assets (in millions). TDTA is equal to total debt divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity
divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets recorded on the balance sheet divided by total
assets. RDTEXP is research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is the standard
deviation of weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity. ROE represents net income (all operating and nonoperating income and expense, income taxes and extraordinary items) after preference dividend divided by total
common equity. Common equity represents common shareholders’ investment in a company.
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Table 3
Panel Data Regression Results using Mean Forecast Estimates
FEit = | ( Mean forecast EPSit – Actual EPSit ) / Actual EPSit |
FEit = α0 + ui + β1 IFRSit + β2 NOAit + β3 TAit + β4 TDTAit + β5 MVBVit + β6 INTTAit + β7 RDTEXPit + β8 STDEVit + β9 ROEit + eit
IFRS
NOA
TA
TDTA
MVBV
INTTA
RDTEXP
STDEV
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
β7
β8
-0.0118*
0.0044**
-0.0246**
0.0010
-0.0031***
0.0554
-1.3127
0.317***
Equation Coefficient
p-value
1
0.0838
0.0193
0.0221
0.2377
0.0029
0.3444
0.1427
0.0010
Coefficient
-0.0204***
0.0050***
0.0008
-0.0022***
0.0336
-1.2663
0.324***
Equation
p-value
2
0.0020
0.0041
0.3557
0.0052
0.5256
0.1623
0.0008
Coefficient
-0.0232*** 0.0053***
0.0008
0.0475
-1.5679
0.3288***
Equation
p-value
3
0.0011
0.0025
0.3813
0.3299
0.1004
0.0002
0.0009
-0.0026***
-1.3059
0.3182***
Equation Coefficient -0.0196*** 0.0046***
p-value
4
0.0023
0.0069
0.3080
0.0028
0.1010
0.0004
0.0010
-0.0035***
0.3401***
Equation Coefficient -0.0199*** 0.0042***
p-value
5
0.0019
0.0089
0.2375
0.0004
0.0000
Coefficient
-0.0213***
0.0063***
-0.0145
0.0014**
-0.0046***
Equation
p-value
6
0.0000
0.0004
0.1160
0.0123
0.0013
Coefficient
-0.018**
0.0055***
0.3784***
Equation
p-value
7
0.0101
0.0000
0.0000
Equation Coefficient -0.0215*** 0.0083***
p-value
8
0.0006
0.0000

ROE
β9
0.0002
0.2899
0.0002
0.3063
0.0001
0.4288
0.0002
0.2534
0.0002
0.1605

0.0003*
0.0561

F-statistic
3.4074***
0.0000
3.4125***
0.0000
3.4872***
0.0000
3.4414***
0.0000
3.4585***
0.0000
3.4351***
0.0000
3.4685***
0.0000
3.2195***
0.0000

adj R2
0.3162
0.3137
0.3173
0.3133
0.3117
0.3060
0.3058
0.2772

***Indicates rejection of the null at the 1% level, **indicates rejection of the null at the 5% level and *indicates rejection of the null at the 10% level
The constant and fixed effect parameters are not presented in the table. White cross-section standard errors are used in the panel regressions to allow for
general contemporaneous correlation between the company residuals. Cross-section weight is introduced in the regression (Generalised Least Squares
method) to correct for the cross-section heteroscedasticity problem. IFRS is equal to 1 if the forecasts are in the post-IFRS period and 0 otherwise. NOA
is the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). TDTA is equal to total
debt divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets recorded on the
balance sheet divided by total assets. RDTEXP is the research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is the standard deviation
of weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity.
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Table 4
Panel Data Regression Results using Median Forecast Estimates
FEit = | ( Median forecast EPSit – Actual EPSit ) / Actual EPSit |
FEit = α0 + ui + β1 IFRSit + β2 NOAit + β3 TAit + β4 TDTAit + β5 MVBVit + β6 INTTAit + β7 RDTEXPit + β8 STDEVit + β9 ROEit + eit
IFRS
NOA
TA
TDTA
MVBV
INTTA
RDTEXP
STDEV
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
β7
β8

ROE
β9

F-statistic

Equation
1

Coefficient

-0.0273***

0.0079***

-0.0061

0.0009

-0.0049***

-0.0055

-0.4596

0.2571***

0.0002

3.296***

p-value

0.0065

0.0001

0.5401

0.3151

0.0020

0.9202

0.6435

0.0000

0.1958

0.0000

Equation
2

Coefficient

-0.0311***

0.0082***

0.0012

-0.0048***

-0.0351

-0.4185

0.2853***

0.0002

3.4000***

p-value

0.0053

0.0000

0.2422

0.0000

0.5041

0.6654

0.0000

0.3275

0.0000

Equation
3

Coefficient

-0.0355***

0.0088***

0.001

-0.0053

-0.7374

0.2968***

0.0001

3.4517***

p-value

0.0027

0.0000

0.3029

0.9169

0.4858

0.0000

0.4868

0.0000

Equation
4

Coefficient

-0.031***

0.0076***

0.0007

-0.0048***

-0.3925

0.2713***

0.0002

3.3745***

p-value

0.0020

0.0001

0.4329

0.0014

0.6781

0.0000

0.2505

0.0000

Equation
5

Coefficient

-0.0314***

0.0075***

0.0008

-0.0050***

0.2789***

0.0002

3.4241***

p-value

0.0017

0.0001

0.4228

0.0012

0.0000

0.2271

0.0000

Equation
6

Coefficient

-0.0336***

0.0099***

0.0059

0.0006

-0.0048***

3.6651***

p-value

0.0000

0.0000

0.4703

0.4074

0.0022

0.0000

Equation
7
Equation
8

Coefficient

-0.0321***

0.0088***

0.3061***

0.0002

3.4343***

p-value

0.0022

0.0000

0.0000

0.1304

0.0000

Coefficient

-0.0302**
0.0117

0.0002***
0.0000

p-value

3.5698***
0.0000

adj R2
0.3055
0.3120
0.3136
0.3068
0.3081
0.3250
0.3023
0.3069

***Indicates rejection of the null at the 1% level, **indicates rejection of the null at the 5% level and *indicates rejection of the null at the 10% level.
The constant and fixed effect parameters are not presented in the table. White cross-section standard errors are used in the panel regressions to allow for
general contemporaneous correlation between the company residuals. Cross-section weight is introduced in the regression (Generalised Least Squares
method) to correct the cross-section heteroscedasticity problem. IFRS is equal to 1 if the forecasts are in the post-IFRS period and 0 otherwise. NOA is
the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). TDTA is equal to total debt
divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets recorded on the balance
sheet divided by total assets. RDTEXP is the research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is the standard deviation of
weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity.
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